Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 20 | Issue 3

Article 8

January 2004

Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Just How Far Can Inherent Anticipation Extend
Robert A. Matthews Jr.
Louis M. Troilo

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Matthews Jr. and Louis M. Troilo, Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Just How Far Can Inherent Anticipation
Extend, 20 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 779 (2003).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol20/iss3/8

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

SCHERING CORP. V. GENEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.: JUST HOW FAR CAN
INHERENT ANTICIPATION EXTEND?
Robert A. Matthews, Jr. and Louis M. Troilot

I.

INTRODUCTION

United States patent law precludes obtaining or enforcing patents
covering an invention previously in use or described in a printed
publication.' Where a printed prior-art reference discloses within its
four comers all aspects of a subsequently claimed invention, the
reference "anticipates" the claimed invention.
References that
anticipate a claimed invention show that the invention lacks novelty
and renders invalid any claim to that described invention.
In a typical anticipation analysis, the challenger (an accused
infringer, if in litigation, or the Examiner, if in prosecution) usually
tries to show that a single prior-art reference expressly discloses each
and every limitation of the asserted claim. 3 Generally, if the prior-art
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I.
It has done so for the last two centuries. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b) (2000). See
also Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, §§ 1, 6, 1 Stat.
318; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, Chapter 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (describing an invention as not being
"before known or used").
2.
Long ago, Judge Learned Hand stated that "[n]o doctrine of the patent law is better
established than that a prior patent or other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its
four comers adequate directions for the practice of the patent invalidated." Dewey & Almy
Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d. Cir. 1942).
3.
Patent applicants must set forth with particularity the aspects of their invention for
which they contend they are entitled to the exclusionary rights granted by a patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 112, 2 (2000). They do so by presenting claims at the end of the patent specification
that identifies the subject matter the applicant claims as the invention. Autogiro Co. of Am. v.

780

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 20

reference does not disclose each and every claim limitation, the
reference does not anticipate the claim. Sometimes the reference if
combined with another prior-art reference may show each claim
limitation in a way that renders the claimed invention obvious, and
thereby invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), but the reference by itself
still does not anticipate.4
Quite often it is easier to prove that a prior-art reference
anticipates a claimed invention than to prove that it renders the
claimed invention obvious. Obviousness based on a modification of
single prior-art reference or a combination of references requires
proving, inter alia, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would5
have the motivation to make the modification or combination.
Patentees may also try to rebut a primafacie case of obviousness by
presenting evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial
success, teaching away, unexpected results, or long-felt need, etc.6
Anticipation, on the other hand, requires only showing that each
limitation of the claimed invention is found within the four comers of
a prior-art reference. Issues of motivation, commercial success,
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("The claims of the patent provide the
concise formal definition of the invention. They are the numbered paragraphs which
'particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.' 35 U.S.C. § 112."); see also Multiform Desiccants, Inc., v. Medzam, Ltd., 133
F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The claims are concise statements of the subject matter for
which the statutory right to exclude is secured by the grant of the patent."). Each claim
generally contains a series of claim "limitations," i.e., a clause of a claim that identifies a
specific characteristic or aspect of the claimed invention. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space
Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1315 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The district court and the
parties use the term 'element' to refer to subcategories of claim language. However, '[i]t is
preferable to use the term 'limitation' when referring to claim language and the term 'element'
when referring to the accused device."').
4. Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("When more than one reference is required to establish unpatentability of the claimed
invention[,] anticipation under § 102 can not be found, and validity is determined in terms of
§ 103."); Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
5. Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("Knowledge in the prior art of every element of a patent claim, however, is not of itself
sufficient to render [the] claim obvious."); McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
6. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("Such secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might
be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have
relevancy."); Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("It is the secondary considerations that are often the most probative and determinative of
the ultimate conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness.").
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teaching away, or unexpected results have no relevance in rebutting
an assertion of anticipation.7
Challengers seeking to invalidate a patent claim for anticipation
often find that a prior-art reference, which looks promising at first,
falls short of explicitly describing all of the limitations of the claimed
invention. Despite the lack of an express disclosure, if the challenger
can show that the missing aspect necessarily results from practicing
the subject matter explicitly disclosed in the reference, the law will
consider the missing aspect inherently present. Thus, the doctrine of
inherency allows a de facto implicit disclosure to provide missing
express disclosure when considering anticipation.
Where the
combination of the expressly disclosed subject matter and the
inherently disclosed subject matter meets each claim limitation of a
later-claimed invention, the reference inherently anticipates the laterclaimed invention.
Until recently, no reported Federal Circuit case had considered
invalidating a patent claim on the basis that the entire anticipatory
disclosure was inherently disclosed in a prior-art reference. That
changed with the Federal Circuit's
recent decision in Schering Corp.
8
v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
In Schering, the Federal Circuit held that a prior-art reference,
allegedly silent on a later-claimed compound, can nevertheless
inherently anticipate claims to that compound if the production of the
compound necessarily follows from practicing a process described in
the reference. Further, the Federal Circuit held that it does not matter
that one of skill in the art may not have recognized that the prior-art
process inherently produces the later-claimed compound.
This article reviews the law on the doctrine of inherent
anticipation. It further examines the panel's decision in Schering and
the Federal Circuit's later denial of the patentee's petition for an en
banc hearing. Finally, the article provides some suggestions for
drafting claims in view of the decision.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE LAW ON ANTICIPATION AND INHERENCY

The patent system exists to increase the scope of public
knowledge. 9 As part of this purpose, the validity requirements ensure

7.
See Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1998); In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1350-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Malagari, 499 F.2d 1297,
1302 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
8.

339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

9.

Patents provide incentive for inventors to create new inventions. Upon the expiration
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that once subject matter becomes part of the public domain, a patentee
may not later take away the public's right to freely practice that
subject matter.
The validity requirement of novelty and the
corresponding doctrine of anticipation provide one
means of
0
'
domain.
public
the
in
already
matter
subject
protecting
Under the doctrine of anticipation, a patent claim should not
issue, and if issued should not be valid, if a single prior-art reference
discloses the invention as claimed and enables one of skill in the art to
practice the invention.' 1 To anticipate, a single item
of prior art must
2
disclose each limitation of the claimed invention.'
To protect the public knowledge further, however, the law does
not require that a reference must expressly disclose all the claim
limitations of a challenged claim to anticipate that claim. The Federal
of the patent term, those inventions pass to the public domain. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) ("While one great object [of the patent laws] was, by holding out a
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a
limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to promote the progress of
science and useful arts;' and this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to
make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible; having due
regard to the rights of the inventor."). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63
(1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time. The balance between the interest in motivating
innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand,
and the interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has
been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception."); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to
practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public."); Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co., 315 U.S. 759, 768 (1942);
Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920) ("The source of the power to grant patents,
and the consideration for granting them, is the advantage which the public will derive from
them, especially after the expiration of the patent monopoly, when the discoveries embodied in
them shall become a part of the public stock of knowledge.").
10.
See Woodland & Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("Section 102(a) establishes that a person can not patent what was already known to
others. If the invention was known to or used by others in this country before the date of the
patentee's invention, the later inventor has not contributed to the store of knowledge, and has no
entitlement to a patent.").
11.
See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 516, 555 (1870); Verve, LLC v. Crane
Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Invalidity based on 'anticipation' requires
that the invention is not in fact new. A single reference must describe the claimed invention
with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.");
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
12.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the disclosure in a single piece of prior art of each
and every limitation of a claimed invention.").
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Circuit has instructed that "[a]n anticipatory reference

. . .

need not

duplicate word for word what is in the claims. Anticipation can occur
when a claimed limitation is 'inherent' or otherwise implicit in the
relevant reference."' 13 Accordingly, it has been stated that one
"purpose of the rule of inherency is to accommodate common
knowledge, knowledge that judges might
not know but that would be
14
field."'
the
in
practitioners
to
known
The law defines an inherent characteristic as one that is the
"'natural result' flowing from" the teachings or disclosure of the prior
art,15 i.e., a characteristic that is necessarily present and not just a
probable result.
The Federal Circuit explained the standard for determining
inherency as follows:
Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or
possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a
given set of circumstances is not sufficient. If, however, the
disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from
the operation as taught would result in the performance of the
questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure
should be regarded as sufficient. 16

13.
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
1991); accord MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[A] prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitation or limitations not expressly
found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it."); Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Tyler Refrigeration v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 777 F.2d
687, 689 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that a challenger to the validity of the patent successfully
showed that one element not expressly shown in a reference was an inherent feature of the
structure in the reference and therefore anticipated the asserted patent).
14. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res., 304 F.3d 1221, 1229 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), vacated, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2002) (en banc), remanded, 346 F.3d
1051, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As explained in greater detail below, one of skill in the art need
not actually recognize or appreciate the presence of the inherent characteristic in all
circumstances for inherency to apply. See infra note 25.
15. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16. Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981); accordAkamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable
& Wireless Internet Serv., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("A claim limitation is
inherent in the prior art if it is necessarily present in the prior art, not merely probably or
possibly present."); Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) ("Because anticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference
discloses prior art that must necessarily include the unstated limitation, the Japanese patent
cannot inherently anticipate the claims of the '080 patent.") (emphasis in original); Scaltech,
Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Inherency may not be
established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a
given set of circumstances is not sufficient to establish inherency. However, if the natural result
flowing from the operation of the process offered for sale would necessarily result in
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Thus, "[o]ccasional results are not inherent."'
A challenger can use evidence extrinsic to the prior-art reference
to show that the missing item is necessarily present. 8 The challenger
may not, however, use extrinsic evidence to supply missing material
that is not inherent from the information expressly disclosed.1 9 For
example, in Rosco Inc. v. MirrorLite Co.,20 the challenger argued that
its design patent on a mirror inherently anticipated a utility patent on a

mirror that required a varying radius of curvature. 2t The challenger
argued that if it made its mirror in the shape shown in the design
achievement of each of the claim limitations, the claimed invention was offered for sale."),
appeal after remand, 269 F.3d 1321, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing finding of anticipation because
testimony demonstrated that it was only a possibility that claimed nonresonance ejection was
disclosed in reference and stating "The mere possibility that Figure 2 might be understood by
one of skill in the art to disclose nonresonance ejection is insufficient to show that it is
inherently disclosed therein.").
17. MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1365; accord Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp.,
295 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacating summary judgment of anticipation by inherency
since record evidence did not show prior art inherently "created" the image in a computer, as
required by the claim, but may have "created" the image manually and then provided it to the
computer for further processing, and stating "It is irrelevant that a skilled artisan might possibly
use the computer to create the final desired image from the color separations. Inherency does
not embrace probabilities or possibilities."); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043,
1047-48 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that claimed invention was not anticipated by inherency in
example of reference where it was shown that the allegedly inherent compound was not
produced every time when following the teachings of the reference even though validity
challenger's expert performed prior art example thirteen times and obtained claimed material);
Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The
mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is insufficient to
prove anticipation.").
18. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("[R]ecourse to extrinsic evidence is proper to determine whether a feature, while not explicitly
discussed, is necessarily present in a reference. The evidence must make clear that the missing
feature is necessarily present, and that it would be so recognized by persons of skill in the
relevant art.").
19. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("As we
have repeatedly stated, anticipation requires that each limitation of a claim must be found in a
single reference. Although we have permitted the use of additional references to confirm the
contents of the allegedly anticipating reference, we have made clear that anticipation does not
permit an additional reference to supply a missing claim limitation.").
20. 304 F.3d 1373, 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
21. A design patent covers an "ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 35
U.S.C. § 171. It only protects the ornamental aspects of the article and not the functional
aspects of the design. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("A design patent only protects the novel, ornamental features of the patented design.
Where a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim
must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the
patent."); Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563,1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the
design claimed in a design patent is dictated solely by the function of the article of manufacture,
the patent is invalid because the design is not ornamental.").
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patent and used a certain thermoforming process to make the mirror, a
varying radius of curvature would inevitably result. The design
patent, however, provided no disclosure of any process to make the
mirror, and the thermoforming process was not the only way to make
the mirror. Hence, it was not inevitable that one of skill in the art
would use the thermoforming process to make the mirror. On this
basis, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's finding of
anticipation by inherency because the disclosure in the design patent
did not show that a mirror with the required radius of curvature would
necessarily result from using the disclosure of just the design patent.22
Accordingly, while the doctrine of inherency permits accounting for a
prior-art reference's implicit disclosures in an anticipation analysis, it
does not permit filling in missing elements just because one of skill in
the art might know of the missing material from some other source.2 3
To provide complete protection of public knowledge, the law of
inherency protects the naturally flowing consequences of practicing
subject matter already in the public domain even if those
consequences are unknown.2 4 In other words, inherency does not
require prior knowledge, recognition, or appreciation by those of skill
in the art of the inherent characteristic, property, or ingredient. Thus,
the Federal Circuit has explained that:
Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of
those of ordinary skill in the art. Artisans of ordinary skill may not
recognize inherent characteristics or functioning of the prior art.
However, the discovery of a previously unappreciated property of
a prior art composition, or of a scientific explanation for the prior
art's functioning, does25not render the old composition patentably
new to the discoverer.

22. Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1380-81 ("[T]he question is not whether the manufacture of the
mirror using this process inherently results in a varying radius of curvature along the major axis,
but whether one skilled in the art would read the '357 patent as inherently disclosing the
invention of the '984 patent, that is, whether one skilled in the art would read the '357 patent as
showing a mirror of varying radius of curvature along the major axis. There is no evidence in
the record to support a finding that one skilled in the art would so read the '357 patent.").
23. Cf Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
24. See In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (fact that inherent function
of prior-art device was unknown does not permit an applicant from obtaining a patent on that
device by claiming the unknown function since such a patent would remove structure from the
public domain).
25. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999); accord
Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Cruciferous Sprout
Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress
Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1349-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001); MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v.
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Consequently, even if not known before the patenting of an
invention, a later-discovered inherent scientific fact can invalidate the
patent on that invention. 26 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has relied upon
post-issuance evidence to establish inherency. For example, in Eli
Lilly Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the court relied on evidence
generated years after the issuance of a patent to establish inherency to
support invalidating a patent on grounds of double patenting. a7
III. FACTS OF SCHERING

Schering Corporation owns U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233 (the '233
patent), now expired, on its highly successful antihistamine called
"loratadine."
Schering markets loratadine under the trade name
TM
CLARITIN . It also obtained a second patent, U.S. Patent No.
4,659,716 (the '716 patent) claiming, among other things, the
chemical compound descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL).
DCL is a metabolite of loratadine.28 This means that as a
naturally flowing consequence of ingesting loratadine, a patient will
form DCL in the body. 9
Schering sued eight competitors seeking to market their own
Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Polla article's failure to mention hair
depilation as a goal is similarly irrelevant ....
Where, as here, the result is a necessary
consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no import that the article's authors did
not appreciate the results."). See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S.
242, 248 (1945) (holding a patent invalid when "the prior art discloses the method of making an
article having the characteristics of the patented product, though all the advantageous properties
of the product had not been fully appreciated"); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs.,
Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment of anticipation to
method claims directed to administering a drug based on a prior-art reference that described
each step of the method but did not achieve successful results because the claim was construed
as not claiming any specific result and stating that "Newly discovered results of known
processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.");
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding claim
invalid under § 102(a) based on another user's use of inventor's prior machine and stating
"Gore's operation of the 401 machine must thus be viewed as a consistent, reproducible use of
Dr Gore's invention as set forth in claim 1, and it is therefore irrelevant that those using the
invention may not have appreciated the results. Were that alone enough to prevent anticipation,
it would be possible to obtain a patent for an old and unchanged process.").
26. See, e.g., In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81, 86 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (stating what "may be
inherent is not necessarily known"); In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1174 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
27. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 969-70. See also, Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1348.
28. Loratadine and its metabolite DCL structurally differ only in that loratadine has a
carboethoxy group (COOEt) on a ring of nitrogen, whereas DCL has a hydrogen atom on that
ring nitrogen. Unlike conventional antihistamines used at the time Schering launched
CLARITINTM, both loratadine and its metabolite DCL are nondrowsy antihistamines.
29. In some cases, skilled chemists can synthetically form pure versions of a metabolite
in a lab.

2004]

SCHERING V. GENEVA PHARMACEUTICALS

787

versions of antihistamines with loratadine for infringement of the
'716 patent. Even though these competitors were not seeking to
market DCL, Schering asserted in its suit that by marketing loratadine
for the treatment of allergies before the expiration of the '716 patent,
these competitors would infringe the '716 patent. Schering contended
that infringement existed because loratadine necessarily converts to
This contention spelled
DCL when administered to patients.
Schering's defeat as the district court held the '233 patent inherently
anticipated the claims of the '716 patent that were broad enough to
cover DCL produced in vivo from ingesting generic loratadine.
Schering's '233 patent issued more than a year before the filing
date of the '716 patent. Accordingly, the Schering competitors could
use the '233 patent as prior art against the '716 patent.30 While the
'233 patent discloses a class of compounds including loratadine,
Schering alleged it did not describe DCL or refer to metabolites of
loratadine. Nonetheless, during the infringement suit, the competitors
moved for summary judgment that the '233 patent inherently
anticipated the broad claims of the '716 patent covering DCL when
formed inside a patient. The district court construed, and the parties
agreed, that claims 1 and 3 of the '716 patent covered DCL in all its
forms, including "metabolized within the human body" and
"synthetically produced in a purified and isolated form.", 31 For
purpose of the motion, the district court assumed that the '233 patent
did not expressly disclose DCL. Nonetheless, based on the evidence
presented, it found that DCL necessarily resulted when a patient
ingested loratadine according to the treatment process described in the
'233 patent.
The district court based its decision in large part on the extensive
evidence presented by the competitors that every human who ingests
loratadine will convert it to DCL. This evidence included twenty one
clinical studies performed by the competitors in which all 864 patients
involved had measurable amounts of DCL in their systems after
ingesting loratadine. The evidence also included thirteen clinical
studies performed by Schering in which all 144 patients involved had
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2000) reciting, in relevant part: "A person shall be entitled to
a patent unless.., the invention was patented.., in this or a foreign country... more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States."
31. The claims of the '716 patent are also directed to pharmaceutical compositions
containing an effective amount of DCL (claims 5, 7, 9, 11, and 12) and methods of treating
allergic reactions by administering an effective amount of DCL (claims 14 and 15). As the
competitors were not seeking to market DCL, Schering did not assert that they will infringe the
pharmaceutical composition or method of treatment claims in the '716 patent.
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measurable amounts of DCL in their systems after ingesting
loratadine. In fact, Schering's own expert testified that no human has
been found who does not metabolize loratadine to DCL.32 Based on
this evidence and applying its construction of the challenged claims as
covering DCL formed in vivo, the district court granted the
competitors' summary-judgment motions that the disclosure in '233
33
patent inherently anticipated the broad claims of the '716 patent.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION ON APPEAL
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district's court's summary
judgment of invalidity. It saw no reason to limit the doctrine of
inherency to situations only where the inherent disclosure filled in a
gap in a prior-art reference. Writing for the court, Judge Rader
reasoned that:
Because inherency places subject matter in the public domain as
well as an express disclosure, the inherent disclosure of the entire
claimed subject matter anticipates as well as inherent disclosure of
a single feature of the claimed subject matter. The extent of the
inherent disclosure does not limit its anticipatory effect. In
general, a limitation or the entire invention is inherent and in the
public domain if it is the "natural result flowing from" the explicit
disclosure of the prior art.

This court sees no reason to modify the general rule for inherent
anticipation in a case where
inherency supplies the entire
34
anticipatory subject matter.
Thus, under the Federal Circuit's rationale, the extent to which a
prior-art reference discloses inherent subject matter does not limit the
applicability of the doctrine of inherency. Instead, a court must focus
on whether the alleged inherent subject matter naturally and
necessarily results from what the reference does disclose.
The Federal Circuit further supported its ruling by relying on the
famous axiom of patent law "that which would literally infringe if
later in time anticipates if earlier." 35 It noted that a person may
infringe a claim to a metabolite if the person ingests a compound that

32.

Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (D.N.J. 2002).

33.

Id. at 540-43.

34.
35.

Schering, 339 F.3d at 1379.
Id.at 1380; accordPeters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537, (1889).
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metabolizes to form the metabolite.36 Accordingly, a disclosure of
ingesting that compound would anticipate a later claim to the
metabolite formed from that ingestion.
In Schering's case, the Federal Circuit found that the undisputed
evidence showed that DCL necessarily formed whenever patients
ingest loratadine under normal conditions. 37 The formation of DCL in
a patient did not require unusual conditions, and it did not need an
accident of circumstances.38 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found
that the disclosure of administering loratadine to patients in the '233
patent provided an inherent disclosure of the DCL metabolite.3 9 Since
the broad claims in the '716 patent covered all forms of DCL,
including those formed inside a patient's body, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the '233 patent inherently anticipated these claims.4 °
Schering tried to avoid the application of the doctrine of
inherency by arguing that one of ordinary skill in the art must
recognize and appreciate the inherent disclosure for the doctrine to
apply. 4 1 According to Schering, since at the time of the invention of
the '716 patent one of skill in the art allegedly did not appreciate that
DCL formed when a patient ingested loratadine, inherent anticipation
should not apply. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. After
considering several Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases, the
Federal Circuit instructed that the case law does not require one of
skill in the art to recognize the inherent disclosure before the critical
date of the challenged patent.42
Schering also argued that inherent anticipation based on the
publication of the '233 patent should not exist because the process
disclosed in the '233 patent had not been publicly used before the

36. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380 (citing Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. v. Lehman, 109
F.3d 756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he right to exclude may arise from the fact that when
administered, [the accused product] metabolizes into another product.., which Hoechst has
claimed."), and Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1421-22 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (stating that a compound claim could cover a compound formed upon ingestion)).
37. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380.
38. Id. at 1378.
39. The '233 patent not only distinguished compounds from the prior-art by noting the
benefits of using loratadine to treat humans but expressly disclosed the preferred human dosage
range.
40. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380.
41. Id. at1377.
42. Id. at 1378 (noting that "cases dealing with 'accidental, unwitting, and unappreciated'
anticipation also do not show that inherency requires recognition." and citing Eibel Process Co.
v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880)). See
also supra note 25.
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critical date of the '716 patent.43 Schering argued that because it only
tested loratadine in secret before the critical date, DCL never entered
the public domain such that it could be prior art against the '716
patent."
The Federal Circuit disagreed that an actual use was
required. It instructed that anticipation requires only an enabling
disclosure. It does not require the actual creation or reduction to
practice of the prior-art subject matter.45 Accordingly, the court held
that the actual administration of loratadine to patients, whether public
or secret, before the critical date of the '716 patent is irrelevant.4 6
Rather, the '233 patent suffices as an anticipatory reference for
purposes of inherency if it discloses in an enabling manner
administering loratadine to patient in a way that would necessarily
produce DCL within the patient.4 7
Considering whether the '233 patent contains an enabling
disclosure of DCL, the Federal Circuit noted that this prior-art patent
had to describe only how to make DCL in any form encompassed by
a compound claim covering DCL, including DCL as a metabolite in a
patient's body.48 Because the '233 patent discloses administering
loratadine to a patient, the inherent result of which is the formation of
DCL metabolite, the Federal Circuit held that the '233 patent provides
an enabling disclosure for making DCL.49

The Federal Circuit further noted that its ruling does not totally
preclude an applicant from obtaining valid claims to a purified,
isolated, or synthetic form of a metabolite when the prior art shows
the use of the base drug. ° Patent applicants can claim the metabolite
in a substantially pure form. Applicants may also claim the
metabolite as part of a pharmaceutical composition. In fact, the '716
patent includes such claims. 1 Further, an applicant can claim a
method of treatment by administering the metabolite or corresponding
pharmaceutical composition. As an example of this tact, the Federal
43.

Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380-81.

See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); Scaltech, Inc. v.

Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The date exactly one year prior to
the date of application for the patent is known as the critical date.").
44.

Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380-81.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Id. at 1381.
Id.

50.

Id.

51.

See, e.g., Claim 5 of the '716 patent, which recites "An antihistaminic pharmaceutical

composition which comprises an antihistaminic effective amount of a compound as defined in
claim I in combination with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier."
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Circuit noted that the '233 patent did not inherently anticipate the
narrower claims in Schering's '716 patent covering methods of
administering DCL.
Finally, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's finding
that there was no genuine issue of material fact about whether
ingestion of loratadine necessarily produces DCL. The Federal
Circuit found that the district court's conclusion was supported by
extensive evidence, including thirteen clinical studies performed by
Schering in which all 144 patients involved had measurable amounts
of DCL in their systems after ingesting loratadine. Similarly,
appellees reported 21 clinical studies in which all 864 patients
involved had measurable amounts of DCL in their systems after
ingesting loratadine.5 z
In sum, the Federal Circuit favored the principle of guarding
against removing subject matter from the public domain when it
decided that inherency can apply even if a prior-art reference fails to
explicitly describe anything of the later-claimed invention if the
practice of the prior art would necessarily produce the later-claimed
invention. For these reasons, the court saw no reason to modify the
general rule for inherent anticipation
where inherency supplies the
53
entire anticipatory subject matter.
V. THE

DENIAL OF AN

EN BANC

HEARING

After the panel's decision, Schering sought a combined petition
for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. The Federal Circuit
denied both petitions.54 Judge Newman and Judge Lourie wrote
separate dissents from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
In her dissent, Judge Newman opined that the panel's decision
departed from the established law of anticipation because, in her
view, no precedent supported the position that "a product whose
existence was not previously known and that is not in the prior art is
always unpatentable on the ground that it existed undiscovered."55
Summarizing precedent, she concluded that the common thread in all
applications of inherent anticipation initially concerns "whether the

52. The court noted that this data conforms with Schering's own expert, who testified that
no human has been found that does not metabolize loratadine to DCL. Schering, 339 F.3d at
1382.
53. Id. at 1379.
54. Schering Corp., v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at993.
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thing that is claimed was disclosed in a single prior-art reference. ' 6
By noting the importance that the reference disclose the "thing", i.e.
subject matter of the claimed invention as opposed to the limitations
of the claimed invention, Judge Newman appears to support limiting
the application of inherent anticipation to filling in gaps in a
reference. Under this view, inherent anticipation would not apply
where the reference contains no express disclosure of the subject
matter later claimed because the "thing" is not disclosed.
Judge Newman also expressed concern with the rejection of the
contention that "inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior
art."57 Focusing on the definition of "invention" of 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(a), as including "discovery", she also stated that the patent laws
have long established that "an inventor may discover something that
already existed., 58 Hence, in her view, a rule of law that precludes
patenting a discovery on the grounds that it already existed where one
of skill in the art did not already recognize the discovery violates prior
precedent.
Judge Lourie separately dissented. He opined that because the
panel's decision "effectively preclud[es] virtually all patents on
human metabolites of drugs," exceptional circumstances existed
warranting consideration by the full court. 60 He also suggested that
whether inherent anticipation should lie may depend on the prior use
of the pharmaceutical product. In his view, actual commercial use of
the drug product could justify finding inherent anticipation. But a
mere publication of information relating to a drug product without
any actual commercial use of that product might not. He stated:
I do not question that when a pharmaceutical product has been in
actualpublic use prior to the filing of a patent application on its

56. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 995. Judge Newman expressed her view of inherency requiring recognition in
authoring the panel opinion in Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res., 304
F.3d 1221, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("When anticipation is based on inherency of limitations not
expressly disclosed in the assertedly anticipating reference, it must be shown that the
undisclosed information was known to be present in the subject matter of the reference."). That
decision, however, was later vacated. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. &
Res., 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2002) (en banc), remanded, 346 F.3d 1051, 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
58. Schering, 339 F.3d at 994 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2000) ("The term 'invention'
means invention or discovery.")).
59. Judge Newman relied on the purported record evidence that no reference showed the
claimed descarbethoxyloratadine (or DCL), or that a person of ordinary skill would have known
that DCL is formed in viva upon ingestion of loratadine. Schering, 348 F.3d at 995.
60. Id.
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metabolite, the metabolite will also have been in public use and
hence will be unpatentable. The holding of this case, however,
goes much further, mandating that the mere issuance of the patent
on the product-or any other publication of that productinherently anticipates claims to the metabolite merely by disclosing
that the product can be administered to a patient, on the theory that
such administration would
inevitably cause the human body to
"make" the metabolite. 61
Judge Lourie did not focus his dissent on the specific precedent
relating to inherent anticipation, per se, but to the level of disclosure
required to preclude patenting a metabolite of a known
pharmaceutical based on the disclosure of the pharmaceutical.
According to Judge Lourie, "merely ... disclosing [in a patent]
that the [pharmaceutical] product can be administered to a patient, on
the theory that such administration would inevitably cause the human
body to 'make' the metabolite," is not an enabling disclosure. 62
While acknowledging that such statements on how to make and use
the claimed pharmaceutical product may have satisfied the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for the product, Judge Lourie
believed that they do not provide an enabling disclosure of how to
make any metabolites "sufficiently to anticipate them by inherency. ' 63
Thus, he stated that in his view, "to hold that a patent on a product,
with a minimal disclosure of administering it to a human or other
subject, anticipates a later application of a metabolite, of which
no
64
correct.,
be
cannot
patent,
the
in
whatsoever
appears
mention
VI. DRAFTING CLAIMS IN VIEW OF SCHERING

The ruling in Schering shows that the law will not generally
allow a pioneer-drug manufacturer to obtain a defacto extension of a
patent on a drug by claiming in a later patent a chemical composition
necessarily formed when a patient simply ingests the drug in its usual
course of treatment. If the creation of a synthetic form of metabolite
has novelty, patent law can protect the claims drawn to the synthetic
metabolite.
Under Schering, it cannot protect the metabolite if
claimed so broadly that the claim covers metabolites naturally
forming in a patient when following a known treatment procedure

61.

Id. at 996 (emphasis in original).

62.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 956.

63.

64.
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disclosed in the alleged anticipatory reference. 65 Indeed, Judge Rader
stated in Schering that claims narrowly drawn to a purified, isolated,
or synthetic form of the metabolite or a method of administering the
metabolite would not generally be inherently anticipated by the use of
the drug product. He explained:
[T]his court's conclusion on inherent anticipation in this case does
not preclude patent protection for metabolites of known drugs.
With proper claiming, patent protection is available for metabolites
of known drugs.

A skilled patent drafter... might fashion a claim to cover the
metabolite in a way that avoids anticipation. For example, the
metabolite may be claimed in its pure and isolated form... , The
patent drafter could also claim a method of administering the
metabolite or the corresponding pharmaceutical composition. The
'233 patent would not provide an enabling disclosure to anticipate
such claims because,
for instance, the '233 patent does not disclose
66
isolation of DCL.
Although Schering involved a pharmaceutical compound, its
application may extend to other technologies. Patent practitioners in
all fields, therefore, should try to include claims of varying scope,
including claims to a pure or synthetic form of the invention or to
different methods of using the invention, if the issue of inherent
anticipation could arise.
For example, in the field of nanotechnology, 7 the issue of
patentability may turn on whether the nanolevel properties of known
materials are inherent to the material or whether new or improved
properties, or both, result when the known material is manipulated on
the nanolevel. 6 s It is possible that, in a particular case, a challenger
65.
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 ("[M]etabolites may
not receive protection via compound claims. In this case, for instance, claims I and 3 broadly
encompass compounds defined by structure only. Such bare compound claims include within
their scope the recited compounds as chemical species in any surroundings, including within the
human body as metabolites of a drug. As this case holds, these broad compound claims are
inherently anticipated by a prior-art disclosure of a drug that metabolizes into the claimed
compound.").
66. Id.
67. Nanotechnology is broadly defined as research and development at the atomic or
molecular scale. It is one of today's fastest growing technologies. In its broadest sense,
nanotechnology embraces a multidisciplinary combination of chemistry, physics, electronics,
and engineering. The ability to design materials at this "nanolevel" has led, and continues to
lead, to many novel products with wide-ranging applications.
68. Attractive forces, such as van der Waal and Columb forces, that ordinarily play a
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could show that the nanolevel properties of a nanomaterial are
inherent to that material in its known macro state. If a patent covering
the nanomaterial had broad claims only to the nanolevel properties,
the claims might not withstand an inherent-anticipation challenge
under Schering. But if the patent also included claims to the
"synthetic" aspects of the invention such as the specific size of
material or the solution of new problems caused by the reduction in
size, the law on inherency, even after Schering, would probably not
defeat patentability.69
VIL.CONCLUSION

Schering clarifies the extent that the doctrine of inherent
anticipation can apply. Those who prosecute patent applications, and
those who litigate patents, need to be mindful of its rule to avoid
being blind-sided by an inherent disclosure.

minor role in bulk material, can have significant effect on materials in the nanosize, and thereby
result in a nanomaterial that behaves drastically different from its corresponding macromaterial.
69. In many nanotech inventions, the decrease in size creates new problems that did not
exist at the macro-scale. This decrease may require the development of new manufacturing
methods or new materials.
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